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MORTGAGES - REDEMPTION - RIGHT OF MORTGAGEE TO R:sQUIRB p ARTIAL 
REDEMPTION-The mortgagor of the premises in question died leaving as his 
heirs-at-law the plaintiff and eight other children. Shortly thereafter, the 
mortgagee commenced proceedings to foreclose the mortgage under a power 
of sale. ];>ending these proceedings the plaintiff entered the military service 
of the United States and thus became entitled under the Soldiers and Sailors 
Civil Relief Act of 19401 to protection against the exercise of the power of 
sale. The mortgagee purchased at the foreclosure sale and thereafter made 
extensive improvements on the land. Plaintiff brought a bill to redeem the 
premises, tendering the entire amount of the mortgage debt. Mortgagee's de-
murrer to the bill was sustained. On appeal, held, affirmed. The rule that 
a part owner of the equity of redemption must redeem the entire premises is 
for the benefit of the mortgagee, and the mortgagee may at his election insist 
upon a partial redemption. Cooper v. Peak, 258 Ala. 167, 61 S. (2d) 62 (1952). 
The rule is well settled that any person who holds a legal estate in mort-
gaged land, derived through, under, or in privity with the mortgagor, is 
entitled to redeem the land,2 and this equity of redemption cannot be ex-
tinguished by a foreclosure to which he is not a party.3 At the same time, the 
1 54 Stat. L. 1178, §302(3) (1940). For the purposes of this case the court assumes 
the act would cover the situation here presented although there appears to be substantial 
doubt as to its applicability. See generally 130 A.L.R. 774 (1941). 
22 JoNEs, MORTGAGES §1352 (1928); Smith v. Austin, 9 Mich. 465 at 474 (1862). 
But cf. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Ann Arbor Railroad Co., (6th Cir. 1898) 90 F. 
379. 
s Byron v. Kales, 162 U.S. 411, 16 S.Ct. 802 (1895); 2 JoNEs, MoRTGAGEs §1342 
(1928). 
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mortgagee has an entire debt secured on the whole property, and no party 
interested in the whole premises or in any portion of them can compel the 
mortgagee to accept a part of the debt and to relieve a part of the property 
from the lien.4 However, the mortgagee or his purchaser at the foreclosure 
sale may waive the right to enforce redemption for the whole amount of the 
mortgage debt, and accept a proportionate part of the debt from one entitled 
to redeem it 5 Thus in the usual case where the owner of a partial interest in 
the equity of redemption seeks to redeem only his interest in the land by pay-
ment of his proportionate share of the debt, the mortgagee may insist upon full 
redemption or none at all. The principal case suggests a corollary to this rule, 
viz., that the mortgagee has a right to insist upon partial redemption when the 
owner of a partial interest in the mortgaged land seeks to redeem the entire 
premises.6 While the rule is generally unequivocally stated that one owning 
such partial interest is entitled to redeem the entire mortgage,7 there have 
been few cases dealing with the question of whether this is an absolute right, 
or a right conditioned upon the will of the mortgagee. It may be argued that 
since the mortgagee claims only a security interest in the mortgaged land, prior 
to foreclosure he is entitled to nothing more than payment of the secured debt 
by one not a volunteer; since one having an interest in the land to protect is 
not a volunteer, the mortgagee should be required to accept payment from such 
a person and relieve the entire premises from the mortgage.8 However, this 
reasoning has not been rigidly adhered to where the equities of the mortgagee 
are such that injustice will be done to him if he is compelled to convey the 
whole mortgaged premises upon receipt of the mortgage debt.9 The rule re-
quiring full redemption is for the benefit and protection of the mortgagee and 
should not be invoked to work an injustice upon him. There are no compelling 
4Taylor v. Porter, 7 Mass. 355 (1810); 2 JoNEs, MORTGAGES §1362 (1928). But 
see notes 6 and 12 infra. A part owner may not require other part owners to join with him 
in redeeming from the mortgage. If he elects to redeem he must pay the whole amount 
due on the mortgage and hold it to his own use, unless the other part owners elect to 
contn'bute, in which case he will be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee. Calkins v. 
Munsel, 2 Root (Conn.) 333 (1795); Taylor v. Porter, supra. 
5 Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kirchoff, 133 ill. 368, 27 N.E. 91 (1890). See also 
Quinn Plumbing Co. v. New Miami Shores Corp., 100 Fla. 413, 129 S. 690 (1930); anno-
tation, 73 A.L.R. 600 (1931). 
6 The mortgagee has been held to have a right to insist upon partial redemption where 
he has become an owner of the equity of redemption apart from that share belonging to 
the plaintiff. If the plaintiff were required to pay the entire mortgage debt he would at 
once acquire the right of reimbursement against the mortgagee as owner of the other share 
of the redemption interest and be subrogated to the mortgage to collect the share held by 
the mortgagee. As a short cut it is said that the mortgagee may insist upon partial 
redemption. See OsnoRNE, MORTGAGES 877, n. 62 (1951). 
7Rothschild v. Bay City Lumber Co., 139 Ala. 571, 36 S. 785 (1904); Owens v. 
Commonwealth Trust Co., 183 Ill. App. 605 (1913) (redemption from sale). See also 
59 C.J.S., Mortgages §848(b) (1949). 
SSee 3 WASH, & LEE L. REv. 328 (1941). 
9Dougherty v. Kubat, 67 Neb. 269, 93 N.W. 317 (1903); Boqut v. Coburn, 27 
Barb. (N.Y.) 230 (1858); Wilson v. Tarter, 22 Ore. 504, 30 P. 499 (1892). See also 
Parker v. Dendy, 203 Ark. 188, 157 S.W. (2d) 48 (1941), criticized in 3 WASH. & LEE 
L. REv. 328 (1941). 
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equities to he protected when a part owner seeks to redeem prior to foreclosure, 
for in such a case the entire equity of redemption is outstanding and the mort-
gagee knows his interest in the land is subject to complete defeasance.10 The 
injustices arise only where the mortgagee is in possession believing himself to 
he the absolute owner of the land, e.g., where there has been a foreclosure to 
which an owner of a partial interest was innocently omitted as a party.11 Given 
this situation, some courts hold that the mortgagee may insist upon partial 
redemption, and conversely cannot insist upon full redemption.12 This result 
is justified on the grounds that, by voluntarily foreclosing, the mortgagee has 
"severed his right, and changed his interest in the land, so that he has an 
absolute indefeasible title to a part of it but a defeasihle title to the balance."13 
However, other courts go further and hold that since the rule requiring full 
redemption is for the benefit and protection of the mortgagee, the mortgagee 
should be allowed to elect whether he will insist upon full or partial redemption 
in such cases.14 This is the position taken by the court in the principal case. 
The result seems to be desirable for it tends toward the equitable adjustment 
of the rights of the parties, and at the same time induces higher bids at the 
foreclosure sale by holstering the confidence of purchasers in the title thereby 
acquired.15 
James S. Taylor, S.Ed. 
10 Compare Parker v. Dendy, note 9 supra (foreclosure was valid as to all except the 
party not joined and the court held that the mortgagee could insist upon partial redemption), 
with Baker v. Boyd, 196 Ark. 563, 119 S.W. (2d) 524 (1938) (foreclosure was entirely 
void because of a misdescription in the deed and the part owner was allowed to redeem the 
entire premises). But see French v. Burns; 35 Conn. 359 (1868). 
11 See cases cited in note 9 supra. Similar equities are present when there has been 
a release of the equity of redemption in lieu of foreclosure and the mortgagee has taken 
possession in the belief that the release was valid. 2 JoNEs, MORTGAGES §1484 (1928). 
Parker v. Dendy, note 9 supra, indicates that the foreclosure of all other interests is suffi-
cient in itself to establish the requisite equities of the mortgagee. However, in every other 
case that this writer has examined there has been some additional factor making full 
redemption inequitable. E.g., in the principal case the mortgagee had made extensive 
improvements on the land, and there were also facts tending to establish an estoppel against 
the redemptioner. Cf. MacKenna v. Fidelity Trust Co., 184 N.Y. 411, 77 N.E. 721 
(1906), where it appeared that the owner of a dower interest, knowing of the foreclosure, 
unduly delayed in seeking redemption. See also cases cited in note 9 supra. 
12 Green v. Dixon, 9 Wis. 485 (1859). Contra, Street v. Beal, 16 Iowa 68 (1861). 
13 Green v. Dixon, note 12 supra. 
14 See cases cited in note 9 supra. 
15 "A rule so drastic [allowing full redemption against the will of the mortgagee] 
would have the effect of making insecure property holdings acquired in the utmost good 
faith, and would render uncertain many titles based upon foreclosure and confirmation 
decrees ••.• " Parker v. Dendy, note 9 supra, at 190. 
